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The application of non-financial performance measures (NPMs) in managers’ 
incentive plans and performance measurement has become a hot issue among 
researchers since the introduction of balanced-scorecard by Kaplan and Norton. 
However, there are few studies on NPMs application in divisional managers’ incentive 
plans with the size of Chinese enterprise becoming more and more bigger and the 
universal phenomenon of firms’ decentralization. Therefore, this paper focuses on the 
design of divisional managers’ incentive contracts and studies the related questions of 
combining NPMs into the design of divisional managers’ incentive contracts from the 
perspective of balancing, contract and agency theory. 
Firstly, this paper analyses the theory basis of combining NPMs in managers’ 
incentive contracts, the application, weight, model construction of NPMs in incentive 
contracts and questions about divisional managers’ incentive plans under 
decentralization conditions from the perspective of balancing, contract and agency 
theory. Secondly, this paper follows the method of layer-upon-layer and first 
researches the simplest contexts of single NPMs application in single divisional 
managers’ incentive contracts design, and then studies the role of single NPMs which 
is combined with divisional managers’ incentive contracts in promoting strategy 
alignment between divisions under muli-divisional contexts. Based on these 
researches, the paper studies the balancing relation and countervailing effect of 
Multi-NPMs on divisional managers’ actions in incentive contracts design. Lastly, this 
paper designs a questionnaire according to above research and tests part of the 
conclusions of the preceding chapters’ research using the survey data. The main 
contributions of this paper are reflected as follows. 
1. Deepening some content about balancing and contract theory to some degree in 
the design of incentive contracts. For the relations between NPMs and financial 
measures, the paper divides it into two types: one is NPMs’ influence on short-term 
financial return and the other is its’ influence on long-term financial return. Based on 
these categories, the paper constructs a model and investigates the impact of 
divisional managers’ personal information on NPMs weight in incentive contracts. 
The research shows that as the divisional managers’ personal pre-decision information 













the statistical relation between NPMs and the long-term financial return increases, the 
weight of NPMs will increase in the design of incentive contracts. However, as the 
impact of NPMs on short-term financial return increases, the weight of NPMs in 
incentive contract will decrease. 
2. From the angle of agency theory and contractual theory, this paper analyzes the 
question of combining NPMs into divisional managers’ incentive contracts under 
multi-divisional conditions in promoting strategy alignment between divisions. This 
paper shows that when there needs collaboration between divisional managers and 
where there exists idiosycratic human capital investment effects in dynamic 
multi-period, which is in terms of learning effect，NPMs can be used to facilitate 
strategy collaboration and  to promote strategy alignment between divisions. It also 
can remedy the defect of firms’ accounting measures, which gives another explanation 
for the broad application of NMPs. 
   3. Complementing some new ideas in balancing theory in the design of incentive 
contracts. Based on results of early research literatures on the balancing relations 
between financial and NPMs, this paper researches the balancing relations of 
Multi-NPMs and probes that the interaction effect possibly existing among NPMs 
may lead to managers’ moral hazard problems, which can be seen as a beneficial 
compementary for balancing theory.   
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①经济附加值指标（Economic Value Added，简称 EVA）是对企业利润进行适当调整后的价值指标，用公式
表示为 EVA EBIT A Kt w= − ，是由 Stern Steward 在 1991 年提出的。 
②平衡计分卡（Balanced Scorecard）是 1992 年由 Robert S.Kaplan 和 David P. Norton 在《哈佛商业评论》提
出并加以倡导的。 
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